

**RISK ASSESSMENT OF DELINQUENT YOUTHS
COMMITTED TO THE
DIVISION OF YOUTH SERVICES,
STATE OF GEORGIA**

by

Jeffrey A. Butts and Paul DeMuro

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF *Youth Policy*



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The members of the Georgia Risk Assessment Task Force and the authors of this report would like to offer a posthumous expression of appreciation and gratitude to Representative Lorenzo Benn and Judge Romae Powell for their commitment to the juvenile justice system and to the youth of Georgia.

ABSTRACT

The Center for the Study of Youth Policy at the University of Michigan recently conducted a study of over 3,300 delinquent youths who were under commitment status to the State of Georgia's Division of Youth Services (DYS) on March 1, 1990. The study was made possible by a gift from the Annie E. Casey Foundation and was designed and conducted under the guidance of a task force composed of Georgia legislators, administrators, law enforcement officials, judges, educators, advocates, and service providers. The study analyzes computerized data about the youths, including their criminal histories and a number of demographic characteristics. The data were compiled in such a way as to protect the individual identities of the youths and their families.

Using factors that indicate the severity and chronicity of criminal behavior, the committed youths were ranked along a continuum which estimates the risk they present to the public safety. The risk scores measure the severity of the youths' behavior, not the totality of their treatment needs. Thus, the risk assessment methodology should not be seen as a placement tool. Risk assessment, however, focuses on the very element which is most central to the functioning of a criminal justice agency -- the public risk presented by individual offenders. Although commitment and placement decisions involve several factors in addition to public safety, the degree to which these decisions are consistent with the concern for public safety is a fundamental barometer of the effectiveness and efficiency of a juvenile justice system.

Based upon the risk assessment analysis and discussions with key actors in Georgia, the findings of the study include:

- * An estimated 33 percent of the delinquent youths confined to Georgia training schools, or Youth Development Centers (YDCs), had risk scores which suggest that they could be handled in other, less expensive programs provided such programs were available.¹
- * Juvenile programs other than the YDCs are currently handling a range of offenders, including some with relatively high risk scores. The effectiveness of community-based and/or non-residential programs in treating these offenders should be monitored and further supported.
- * The implementation of "designated felony" statutes in the State of Georgia has eroded the discretion over commitment and placement decisions which should rightly be exercised by the courts and the Division of Youth Services. The State should reconsider the impact this legislation has on the cost-effectiveness of its juvenile justice system.
- * A large proportion (nearly four-fifths) of the juveniles confined in Georgia's YDCs are African American or Black. Some of this disparity is undoubtedly due to higher rates of poverty, family disruption, and school failure among minority communities. Nevertheless, the State should make every attempt to root out vestiges of differential treatment of minority youths by the justice system. The future of Georgia's economy may depend to a large extent on the health and productivity of all its youth.

¹ This is an approximate figure. See the discussion in the Authors' Afterword for more discussion about the risk scores.

INTRODUCTION

This report is the result of a request from the State of Georgia that the Center for the Study of Youth Policy (CSYP) at the University of Michigan conduct a study of delinquent youths being committed to the Georgia Department of Human Resources, Division of Youth Services. The request for the study resulted from discussions between CSYP and several parties, including members of the Georgia legislature and staff from the Division of Youth Services.

Each of the parties agreed that the growing number of delinquency commitments to the Division of Youth Services (DYS) would be a focus of debate in coming years. In Georgia, as in many states across the country, elected officials and the public are becoming more attuned to juvenile crime issues. Many believe that the rate of serious delinquency is growing, particularly drug offenses. Some people will argue for additional correctional institutions to deal with this problem. Others insist that it is more cost-effective to handle juvenile offenders in the least restrictive setting consistent with the public safety, including a range of community-based programs and other alternatives.

The first step in understanding the juvenile justice system is to establish how the system is currently used. Before officials can respond to demands for more juvenile correctional institutions, they must be able to say how the current capacity is being utilized. Toward that end, the state asked CSYP to conduct this study, which was made possible by a gift from the Annie E. Casey Foundation and required no funding from the State of Georgia. The major focus of the study is a risk assessment which uses data on committed youths to rank them according to the seriousness of their delinquent behavior and the potential risk they present to the community.

THE STUDY

This risk assessment study should be seen as a tool for future planning. It does not provide a blueprint for how the state should deploy its juvenile justice resources. It offers a comprehensive examination of the committed population being served by the state of Georgia. A number of other states including New Hampshire, Arkansas, Alabama, Nebraska, and Oklahoma, have recently conducted risk assessment

studies. Using the same basic method, these states have evaluated the legal and demographic profiles of delinquent youths placed in their juvenile corrections systems.¹

Analyzing an institutionalized population on a risk continuum can suggest how the state is utilizing its institutional placements. Obviously, the public needs to be protected from violent and serious delinquent offenders. In order to do so effectively and efficiently, the juvenile justice system must attempt to distinguish the type of juvenile who must be controlled in a secure or institutional setting from the type who could likely be supervised in a non-institutional environment. Risk assessment offers an objective method which can begin to segment the offender population of a juvenile correctional system into relatively low-risk, and relatively high-risk groups so that the use of finite resources can be more efficient.

There are several specific areas in which risk-based decision making can aid juvenile corrections policy makers:

1. Identifying the most serious offenders in order to target residential and non-residential program resources on appropriate groups.
2. Developing consistent placement guidelines in order to insure that youths who have high service needs but are low risks to the public safety do not consume institutional resources needed for more serious offenders.
3. Providing a consistent framework within which a diversified juvenile justice system can be designed that both protects the public safety and addresses the varying needs of delinquent youths.

Methodology

The Center for the Study of Youth Policy began this study when its Director, Professor Ira Schwartz, met with the various parties mentioned above. These discussions led to the decision to undertake an objective analysis of the committed youth population in the state's youth services system.

¹ These studies are available from the Center for the Study of Youth Policy (See Appendix I).

At the request of Ira Schwartz, the authors, one a member of the CSYP research staff (Butts), the other a well-known consultant in the field of juvenile justice programs (DeMuro), examined the population of delinquent offenders under commitment to the Division as of March 1, 1990. About 20 percent of this population was held in the state's Youth Development Centers (YDC). The remaining youths were being supervised in other, non-institutional programs such as intensive probation and community treatment.

The authors toured several state facilities, met with staff, and collected data about the youths in the study sample. The study sample was defined as all committed youths who were in some form of placement on the study date. This resulted in a cross-section, or "snapshot" of DYS commitments. There was no particular significance to the actual date of the study population, other than the convenience of being able to identify a cross-section more easily on the first day of a month. There is no reason to believe that the committed population on March 1, 1990 was systematically different from any other day in recent months.

The authors worked with DYS staff to plan the data collection. This entailed selecting a subset of variables which would be "downloaded" from the large, accumulated database created by the Division's computerized commitment tracking system. In the past, CSYP has had to rely on labor-intensive examinations of each juvenile's case record to collect the information needed for a risk assessment. This procedure was unnecessary in Georgia due to DYS's truly state-of-the-art management information system.

Once the subset of variables had been determined by the authors through discussions with the Division, staff from the Management Information Unit carried out the programming tasks required to assemble the dataset.² The final dataset was sent to CSYP on floppy disk. The data analysis was performed using a standard statistical software package at the Center for the Study of Youth Policy.

To organize the data and prepare the risk assessment itself, the authors relied on the guidance of the task force mentioned above. The task force members included legislators, judges, law enforcement representatives, educators, service providers,

² The authors are most grateful for the able assistance of Ann Watkins of DYS.

youth advocates, and state administrators. (See Appendix II for a list of Task Force members.) The task force met with the authors on four occasions: to plan the study, to score various portions of the risk assessment, and to review initial drafts of this report.

Negotiations with the risk assessment task force regarding the design of the study helped to insure that the collection of information from each juvenile's record, as well as the overall direction of the study was responsive to the values and practices of the Georgia juvenile justice system. *The interpretations and conclusions in this report, however, are those of the authors alone.*

Risk Scores

The risk assessment is designed to incorporate three kinds of information on each committed youth:

1. Demographic -- age, sex, ethnicity, committing county, etc.
2. Background Information -- living situation, history of drug use, etc.
3. Formal records of juvenile court adjudications and commitments.

Although information on other factors (e.g., employment experience, psychological evaluations) would be of interest to many people, the risk assessment is restricted to the most salient risk factors in order to reduce measurement error and keep missing data to a minimum. One of the more common errors in classification and risk assessment studies is to incorporate data on such a wide range of factors that compiling the information becomes highly complex. When this happens, the quality of the risk assessment is not greatly improved, the information that goes into the analysis becomes more subjective, and the entire process becomes less reliable.

There is general agreement among criminologists and researchers that the best indicators of risk for future arrest and adjudication are the recency, severity and chronicity of prior offending, and also how early an individual became formally involved in the juvenile justice system (i.e., age at onset). These factors should comprise the

core of a risk assessment analysis.³ The risk scores analyzed in this study, therefore, are derived from a restricted set of factors associated with potential risk to the community. Although the risk assessment includes other variables, the scores themselves are based upon each youth's history of offenses and juvenile court involvement -- adjudications and commitments.

COMMITTED YOUTHS IN THE YDCs

On March 1, 1990, there were approximately 3,300 delinquent youths under commitment to the Georgia DYS and in some form of placement. Of these, 623 were placed in one of the state's Youth Development Centers. The others were either living with their own families, were in some form of community supervision program, in other placement settings such as group homes and drug treatment facilities, or on "aftercare" status having been released from a placement.

Table 1 provides some basic information about the 623 YDC youths as obtained from the DYS data base. It shows that most youths in the YDCs were male. Females are traditionally served at the Macon YDC. On the study day, there were 35 females in that program. The vast majority (79 percent) of YDC youths were non-White, primarily Black or African-American. This is far higher than the national average for public juvenile training schools (about 55% in 1987).⁴ Some portion of this discrepancy could be due to the size of the minority population in high-crime areas, or the differential involvement of minorities in the justice system, but the high proportion of African Americans in Georgia's juvenile correctional facilities deserves serious and immediate attention.⁵

3. BAIRD, CLASSIFICATION OF JUVENILES: A MODEL SYSTEMS APPROACH, (1984); Also see reviews in GOTTFREDSON & TONRY, PREDICTION AND CLASSIFICATION CRIMINAL JUSTICE DECISION MAKING (1987).

4. STEKETEE, WILLIS & SCHWARTZ, JUVENILE JUSTICE TRENDS: 1977-1987, at 48 (May, 1990).

5. A full understanding of the impact of race in criminal justice processing would require a much more elaborate study and is beyond the scope of this report. While the data on race presented here are not definitive, they at least suggest that further study is warranted.

TABLE 1
Characteristics of YDC Youths

	n	Pct.
Gender		
Male	588	94%
Female (Macon YDC)	35	6%
Ethnicity		
White	128	21%
Non-White	495	79%
Age		
14 and Under	80	13%
15	125	20%
16	221	35%
17 and Over	197	32%
Age at First Adjudication		
12 and Under	175	28%
13	129	21%
14	111	18%
15	117	19%
16 and Over	90	14%
Family in Home		
Two Parent	171	28%
Single Parent	373	60%
Other	75	12%
Alcohol & Drug		
No Use of Subst	64	10%
Experimentation	174	28%
Monthly Use	161	26%
Weekly Use	207	33%
Daily /Dependence	17	3%
Total	623	100%

Note: Totals may not add to 623 due to missing data.

Table 1 also show the ages of the YDC youths as a whole. Most (87 percent) were at least 15 years old on the study day. Nearly a third were age 17. Not surprisingly, many of the youths currently held in YDCs had their first exposure to the

juvenile justice system at an early age. Almost half (49 percent) were first adjudicated by a juvenile court before their fourteenth birthday.

Also not surprising is the fact that sixty percent of the youths in YDC placement had been living in single-parent homes prior to being committed. Table 1 provides the proportions of YDC youths who had been living with one parent or two, or in some alternative situation. Twenty-eight percent of the youths lived with two parents (either birth parents or birth-step parent combinations).

A more surprising finding to some would be that, based on DYS records, the youths placed in the YDCs were not heavily involved in alcohol and drug use. According to the Division's classification profile, only 3 percent of those youths incarcerated on the study day were considered "dependent" on drugs or alcohol, or had been using these substances on a daily basis. Twenty-eight percent had only "experimented" with drinking or drugs; another 10 percent had not used them at all. A third, however, had used alcohol or drugs on at least a weekly basis before being committed. While this level of drug and alcohol use could represent a problem, it does not seem to differ greatly from the incidence of substance abuse in the non-incarcerated youth population.

The age of the YDC youths varied as expected between facilities. As shown in Table 2, the oldest group of juveniles was placed at the Milledgeville YDC, which is known as the "toughest" institution in the system. At Milledgeville, 97 percent of the youths were aged 15 or older. The Augusta YDC also had youths primarily over the age of 15 (89 percent). In contrast, just 63 percent of the youths at the Atlanta YDC on March 1 were at least 15.

TABLE 2
Age of YDC Youths by Placement

	Current Placement					
	Atlanta YDC		Augusta YDC		Millgvl YDC	
	n	Pct.	n	Pct.	n	Pct.
Age on 3/1/90						
14 and Under	36	37%	26	11%	8	3%
15 or 16	56	57%	160	67%	104	44%
17 or Over	6	6%	52	22%	127	53%
Total	98	100%	238	100%	239	100%

(continued)

TABLE 2
Age of YDC Youths by Placement

	Current Placement				Total	
	Macon YDC		Macon A&D		n	Pct.
	n	Pct.	n	Pct.		
Age on 3/1/90						
14 and Under	9	26%	1	8%	80	13%
15 or 16	16	46%	10	77%	346	56%
17 or Over	10	29%	2	15%	197	32%
Total	35	100%	13	100%	623	100%

The YDC facilities varied only slightly in the ethnic composition of their juvenile populations. Table 3 shows that only the Macon YDC had a population which was less than 75 percent minorities. Since this facility had only 35 youths in placement on the study day, this percentage could easily vary from month to month. All the YDCs appeared to contain a predominantly non-White population.

TABLE 3
Ethnicity of YDC Youths by Placement

	Current Placement					
	Atlanta YDC		Augusta YDC		Millgrove YDC	
	n	Pct.	n	Pct.	n	Pct.
Ethnicity						
White	22	22%	54	23%	40	17%
Non-White	76	78%	184	77%	199	83%
Total	98	100%	238	100%	239	100%

(continued)

TABLE 3
Ethnicity of YDC Youths by Placement

	Current Placement				Total	
	Macon YDC		Macon A&D		n	Pct.
	n	Pct.	n	Pct.		
Ethnicity						
White	10	29%	2	15%	128	21%
Non-White	25	71%	11	85%	495	79%
Total	35	100%	13	100%	623	100%

Table 4 contains information on the YDC youths' counties of origin by ethnicity. It demonstrates that a substantial proportion of non-White YDC youths come from large, urban counties. Chatham, Dekalb, and Fulton counties, in fact, account for over forty percent of the minority youths in the YDC population. Adding Bibb, Dougherty, Muscogee, Richmond, Spalding, and Troup counties, accounts for 340 non-White YDC commitments, or 69 percent of the total. This information should not be seen as proof of any willful action on the part of these counties. It merely identifies the areas which account for most minority commitments, regardless of the reasons.

TABLE 4
YDC Youths' County of Origin by Ethnicity

	Ethnicity				Total	
	White		Non-White		n	Pct.
	n	Pct.	n	Pct.		
Population of Committing County						
Over 200,000						
Chatham	6	5%	31	6%	37	6%
Cobb	7	5%	2	0%	9	1%
Dekalb	11	9%	66	13%	77	12%
Fulton	6	5%	108	22%	114	18%
Gwinnett	6	5%	3	1%	9	1%
50 to 200,000						
Bibb	3	2%	16	3%	19	3%
Carroll	1	1%	3	1%	4	1%
Cherokee	2	2%	0	0%	2	0%
Clarke	2	2%	5	1%	7	1%
Clayton	7	5%	8	2%	15	2%
Columbia	1	1%	1	0%	2	0%
Dougherty	2	2%	47	9%	49	8%
Douglas	3	2%	1	0%	4	1%
Floyd	3	2%	5	1%	8	1%
Glynn	1	1%	5	1%	6	1%
Hall	0	0%	4	1%	4	1%
Houston	0	0%	2	0%	2	0%
Lowndes	1	1%	5	1%	6	1%
Muscogee	3	2%	23	5%	26	4%
Richmond	2	2%	30	6%	32	5%
Spalding	5	4%	9	2%	14	2%
Troup	1	1%	10	2%	11	2%
Whitfield	2	2%	0	0%	2	0%
Under 50,000						
Appling	1	1%	0	0%	1	0%
Atkinson	1	1%	0	0%	1	0%
Baldwin	2	2%	2	0%	4	1%
Barrow	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Bartow	3	2%	0	0%	3	0%
Ben Hill	2	2%	0	0%	2	0%
Berrien	2	2%	0	0%	2	0%
Bleckley	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Brooks	1	1%	3	1%	4	1%

(continued)

TABLE 4
YDC Youths' County of Origin by Ethnicity

	White		Non-White		Total	
	n	Pct.	n	Pct.	n	Pct.
Bulloch	2	2%	6	1%	8	1%
Durke	1	1%	7	1%	8	1%
Camden	0	0%	2	0%	2	0%
Candler	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Charlton	2	2%	0	0%	2	0%
Chattooga	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Clinch	1	1%	0	0%	1	0%
Coffee	3	2%	1	0%	4	1%
Colquitt	1	1%	5	1%	6	1%
Cook	1	1%	4	1%	5	1%
Coweta	1	1%	3	1%	4	1%
Crisp	1	1%	2	0%	3	0%
Decatur	0	0%	8	2%	8	1%
Dodge	1	1%	2	0%	3	0%
Dooly	0	0%	2	0%	2	0%
Early	0	0%	3	1%	3	0%
Effingham	1	1%	1	0%	2	0%
Elbert	1	1%	0	0%	1	0%
Emanuel	0	0%	4	1%	4	1%
Evans	0	0%	2	0%	2	0%
Gilmer	1	1%	0	0%	1	0%
Gordon	1	1%	1	0%	2	0%
Grady	2	2%	2	0%	4	1%
Greene	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Hancock	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Hart	0	0%	4	1%	4	1%
Henry	0	0%	4	1%	4	1%
Irwin	0	0%	2	0%	2	0%
Jackson	1	1%	0	0%	1	0%
Jeff Davis	1	1%	0	0%	1	0%
Jefferson	0	0%	3	1%	3	0%
Jenkins	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Lanier	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Laurens	1	1%	1	0%	2	0%
Lee	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Liberty	1	1%	2	0%	3	0%
Macon	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
McDuffie	1	1%	0	0%	1	0%
McIntosh	2	2%	0	0%	2	0%
Meriwether	0	0%	2	0%	2	0%
Mitchell	1	1%	2	0%	3	0%
Monroe	1	1%	0	0%	1	0%
Murray	1	1%	0	0%	1	0%

(continued)

TABLE 4
YDC Youths' County of Origin by Ethnicity

	Ethnicity				Total	
	White		Non-White		n	Pct.
	n	Pct.	n	Pct.		
Newton	0	0%	2	0%	2	0%
Oconee	1	1%	0	0%	1	0%
Paulding	2	2%	0	0%	2	0%
Peach	0	0%	2	0%	2	0%
Polk	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Putnam	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Rockdale	1	1%	0	0%	1	0%
Screven	0	0%	2	0%	2	0%
Sumpter	1	1%	1	0%	2	0%
Tattnall	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Telfair	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Thomas	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Tift	1	1%	2	0%	3	0%
Toombs	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Turner	0	0%	2	0%	2	0%
Upson	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Walton	3	2%	0	0%	3	0%
Ware	1	1%	0	0%	1	0%
Wayne	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Wilcox	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Wilkes	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Worth	1	1%	0	0%	1	0%
Total	128	100%	495	100%	623	100%

Note: 1986 population estimates from U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, Series P-26, 86-S-SC.

Offense History

Table 5 presents the commitment offenses of the youths placed in the YDCs. One of the most frequently cited characteristics of a correctional population is the criminal charge or offense which resulted in each offender's current incarceration. Since all the offenders in this study were committed, the most recent offense will be referred to herein as the commitment offense.

TABLE 5
Commitment Offenses of YDC Youths

	n	Pct.
Commitment Offenses		
Misdms /Non-Violent		
Trespass	1	0%
Crim Damage 2	2	0%
Obstruct Justice	1	0%
Public Disturbance	1	0%
Terroristic Threats	2	0%
VOP	2	0%
Carry Weap no Licens	1	0%
Drive w/o Licence	1	0%
Contrib Delinq	1	0%
Shoplift < \$100	1	0%
Escape no Force	9	1%
Drug Offenses		
Use of Schd I-II Drug	10	2%
Sale of Schd I-II Drug	97	16%
Sell Facsimile Drug	1	0%
Trafficking in Cocaine	2	0%
Property		
Burglary	71	11%
Auto Theft	51	8%
Theft Over \$500	27	4%
Crim Damage 1	1	0%
Forgery	2	0%
Theft Under \$500	3	0%
Poss Crime Tools	1	0%
Entering Auto	2	0%
Arson 3	1	0%
Burglary NRC	42	7%
Shoplift 4th Adj	4	1%
Theft of Firearm	1	0%
Violent		
Arson 1+2	6	1%
Invol Manslaught	1	0%
Child Molestation	19	3%
Agg Child Molest	13	2%
Robbery	20	3%
Battery or Simp Batt	6	1%
Escape w Force	3	0%
Concealed Weapon	1	0%
Agg Asslt Corrc Ofc	6	1%
Robbery NRC	14	2%

(continued)

TABLE 5
Commitment Offenses of YDC Youths

	n	Pct.
Carry Weapon Pub Gath	1	0%
Agg Assault NRC	26	4%
Major Violent		
Murder	12	2%
Vol Manslaught	12	2%
Kidnapping	5	1%
Rape	8	1%
Armed Robbery	48	8%
Agg Assault	72	12%
Agg Sodomy	5	1%
Agg Battery	5	1%
Vehic Homicide 1	2	0%
Total	623	100%

The largest single offender group were those youths committed for the Sale of Schedule I or II Drugs. Ninety-seven YDC youths had been committed for this offense. Other frequent offenses were Burglary (11 percent), Auto Theft (8 percent), Armed Robbery (8 percent), and Aggravated Assault (12 percent).

The offense groups introduced in Table 5 (e.g., property, violent, drug offenses) are used in Table 6 to look at differences between the youths according to the county in which they were committed to DYS. The data in Table 6 show that only minor differences exist in the commitment offenses of youths from smaller counties and large, urban counties. The major difference is the greater proportion of youths from the large counties who were committed for drug offenses (26 percent versus 10 and 15 percent in the smaller counties).

Table 7 considers the same offense groups according to the youths' ethnicity. The most striking feature of these data is the fact that all the youths committed to DYS for drug offenses as of March 1 were non-White. The proportion of White youths committed for property offenses (42 percent) is, in turn, noticeably larger than among non-Whites (31 percent).

TABLE 6
Commitment Offenses of YDC Youths by County

Commitment Offense	Population of Committing County					
	Over 200,000		50 to 200,000		Under 50,000	
	n	Pct.	n	Pct.	n	Pct.
Misd /Non-Violent	9	4%	7	3%	6	4%
Drug Offenses	63	26%	22	10%	25	15%
Property	54	22%	93	44%	59	36%
Violent	48	20%	32	15%	36	22%
Major Violent	72	29%	59	28%	38	23%
Total	246	100%	213	100%	164	100%

TABLE 7
Commitment Offenses of YDC Youths by Ethnicity

Commitment Offense	Ethnicity				Total	
	White		Non-White		n	Pct.
	n	Pct.	n	Pct.		
Misd /Non-Violent	8	6%	14	3%	22	4%
Drug Offenses	0	0%	110	22%	110	18%
Property	54	42%	152	31%	206	33%
Violent	37	29%	79	16%	116	19%
Major Violent	29	23%	140	28%	169	27%
Total	128	100%	495	100%	623	100%

Finally, Table 8 portrays the commitment offenses of the youths by YDC facility. Once again, the Milledgeville YDC stands out as the most serious population, with 60 percent of the youths placed there having been committed for violent offenses. The

offender population at the Augusta YDC was somewhat less serious, although over a third of those youths had also been committed for a violent offense. Table 8 also shows that the Augusta YDC had proportionately more drug offenders than Milledgeville (25 versus 13 percent).

TABLE 8
Commitment Offenses of YDC Youths by Placement

	Current Placement					
	Atlanta YDC		Augusta YDC		Milledgvl YDC	
	n	Pct.	n	Pct.	n	Pct.
Commitment Offense						
Misd /Non-Violent	3	3%	7	3%	8	3%
Drug Offenses	9	9%	60	25%	32	13%
Property	48	49%	85	36%	56	23%
Violent	27	28%	46	19%	34	14%
Major Violent	11	11%	40	17%	109	46%
Total	98	100%	238	100%	239	100%

(continued)

TABLE 8
Commitment Offenses of YDC Youths by Placement

	Current Placement				Total	
	Macon YDC		Macon A&D		n	Pct.
	n	Pct.	n	Pct.		
Commitment Offense						
Misd /Non-Violent	4	11%	0	0%	22	4%
Drug Offenses	1	3%	8	62%	110	18%
Property	13	37%	4	31%	206	33%
Violent	9	26%	0	0%	116	19%
Major Violent	8	23%	1	8%	169	27%
Total	35	100%	13	100%	623	100%

The Atlanta and Macon YDCs, as shown in Table 8, were also serving significant numbers of youths with violent offenses, although more than half of the offenders in these facilities were committed for misdemeanors and other non-violent offenses, property offenses, and drug charges (61 and 51 percent respectively).

Of course, the most recent adjudication does not completely characterize the seriousness of a youth's delinquent behavior. One must also consider such factors as the seriousness of previous offenses, the overall number of offenses, and the youth's age at first adjudication. These factors will be incorporated in the risk assessment analysis presented later in this report.

COMMITTED YOUTHS IN ALTERNATIVE PLACEMENTS

Only about 20 percent of the more than 3,000 youths under commitment status on March 1 were in the state's Youth Development Centers. The rest (2,719) had been placed in other settings, including their own homes. Table 9 presents basic information about all the committed youths in placement on March 1 who were not in one of Georgia's Youth Development Centers.⁶

The columns in Table 9 provide the information according to whether the youths had ever been placed in a YDC. The 1,005 youths in the right-hand columns had been in a YDC previously, but on March 1, 1990 were placed in some alternative setting. Most of these youths (85 percent) were on after-care status, having been released from YDCs and other placements but still under the same commitment order. The other 15 percent could be under new commitments, but the particular circumstances of the case may have suggested that they did not need to be placed in a YDC again.

A comparison of the state's utilization of YDC beds and alternative placements, of course, should focus primarily on the 1,714 youths who had been committed, but not yet placed in a YDC. They are described in the left-hand columns of Table 9. These juveniles could be described as being in the "front end" of the system, as opposed to exiting from the "back end" and possibly nearing the end of a commitment period.

⁶ Not included in the following tables are those youths who had been committed but were still awaiting placement on March 1.

TABLE 9
Characteristics of Non-YDC Youths

	Prior YDC Admissions			
	No		Yes	
	n	Pct.	n	Pct.
Gender				
Male	1384	81%	913	91%
Female	330	19%	92	9%
Ethnicity				
White	797	46%	263	26%
Non-White	917	54%	742	74%
Age				
14 and Under	377	22%	94	9%
15	421	25%	131	13%
16	514	30%	286	28%
17 and Over	402	23%	494	49%
Family in Home				
Two Parent	626	37%	328	33%
Single Parent	859	50%	557	55%
Other	229	13%	120	12%
Alcohol & Drug				
No Use of Subst	325	19%	134	13%
Experimentation	561	33%	312	31%
Monthly Use	479	28%	274	27%
Weekly Use	323	19%	255	26%
Daily /Dependence	22	1%	24	2%
Current Placement				
Non-Residential	827	48%	109	11%
Residential	504	30%	40	4%
Aftercare	377	22%	856	85%
Total	1714	100%	1005	100%

Note: Totals may not add due to missing data on some variables.

On March 1, nearly half of the 1,714 "front end" youths were in non-residential settings. Thirty percent were in residential placements, including foster homes, group homes, mental health treatment centers, and psychiatric hospitals. Just over a fifth of these youths were on aftercare status from a prior placement other than a YDC.

In Table 9, it is apparent that the proportion of females is higher among the committed juveniles who were never placed in a YDC. The non-YDC population is also more Caucasian or White than that of the YDCs. The proportion of Whites in the YDCs on March 1 was just over 20 percent. Those committed youths with previous YDC experience were 26 percent White. Among committed youths never placed in a YDC, however, 46 percent were White.

As would be expected, the youths placed in settings other than the YDCs tended to be younger than their YDC counterparts. Whereas only 13 percent of the YDC youths were younger than age 15, more than 20 percent of the youths in residential and non-residential placements were as young. The Non-YDC youths with previous YDC experience were slightly older than the youths placed in the YDC on the study day. Again, this is not surprising.

In addition to being more Caucasian and slightly younger, the committed youths without any YDC placements were somewhat more likely to live in two-parent families (37 versus 28 percent.) Their use of drugs and alcohol was also slightly less serious. While 62 percent of the YDC youths in Table 1 used drugs or alcohol at a level surpassing "experimentation," this was true of only 48 percent of committed youths who had not been placed in one of the state's YDCs.

Table 10 considers the ethnic composition of the Non-YDC youths in various placement settings. In Table 9, it was shown that 54 percent of the committed youths without prior YDC placements were non-White, primarily African American. This is a far smaller proportion than the YDC population on March 1 which was 78 percent non-White.

TABLE 10
Placement and Ethnicity of Non-YDC Youths

	Prior YDC Admissions				Total	
	No		Yes		n	Pct.
	n	Pct.	n	Pct.		
Current Placement						
Non- Residential						
White	281	34%	31	28%	312	33%
Non-White	546	66%	78	72%	624	67%
Residential						
White	301	60%	22	55%	323	59%
Non-White	203	40%	18	45%	221	41%
Aftercare						
White	211	56%	210	25%	421	34%
Non-White	166	44%	646	75%	812	66%
Total	1708	100%	1005	100%	2713	100%

Note: Totals may not add due to missing data on some variables.

Further ethnic differences emerge within the placement groups as shown in Table 10. Among the committed youths placed in non-residential settings on March 1, 66 percent were non-White. Those in residential placements, on the other hand, were only 40 percent non-White. This discrepancy adds credence to the argument that residential placements are used as an alternative to the YDCs more often for White than non-White youths.

TABLE 11
Placement of Non-YDC Youths by County of Origin

Population of Committing County	Prior YDC Admissions			
	No		Yes	
	n	Pct.	n	Pct.
Over 200,000				
Non-Residential	241	56%	40	9%
Residential	118	28%	19	4%
Aftercare	70	16%	368	86%
50 to 200,000				
Non-Residential	318	49%	42	14%
Residential	203	31%	5	2%
Aftercare	131	20%	253	84%
Under 50,000				
Non-Residential	268	43%	27	10%
Residential	183	29%	16	6%
Aftercare	176	28%	235	85%
Total	1708	100%	1005	100%

Note: Totals may not add due to missing data on some variables.

The data in Table 11 provide the utilization of the different placement settings for non-YDC youths by the size of the county in which the youths were committed. It can be seen that committed youths from smaller Georgia counties were slightly less likely to be placed in non-residential settings than were youths from the largest counties (43 percent versus 56 percent). They were somewhat more likely to be on aftercare status (28 percent versus 16 percent). This could reflect a lack of non-residential services and placements in smaller counties.

TABLE 12
Commitment Offenses of Non-YDC Youths
Without Previous YDC Admissions by Type of Placement

	Current Placement					
	Non-Residential		Residential		Aftercare	
	n	Pct.	n	Pct.	n	Pct.
Commitment Offense						
Misd /Non-Violent	337	41%	211	42%	178	47%
Drug Offenses	76	9%	16	3%	16	4%
Property	274	33%	202	40%	141	37%
Violent	129	16%	73	14%	38	10%
Major Violent	11	1%	2	0%	4	1%
Total	827	100%	504	100%	377	100%

Note: Totals may not add due to missing data on some variables.

Table 12 presents the commitment offenses of the youths in alternative placements on March 1. The data in Table 12 represent only the 1700 youths without prior YDC admissions. Clearly, most of these youths were committed for either misdemeanors and other minor charges, or property offenses.

Among those youths in non-residential placements (about half of whom were living with their own families), just under three-quarters were committed for property offenses or minor charges. Among the youths in residential placements, 82 percent had been committed for these offenses. Only 17 percent of the youths in non-residential placements, and 15 percent of those in residential settings, had been committed for offenses involving violence. The commitment offenses of the youths on aftercare status were comparable.

RISK SCORES

Of course, commitment offenses provide only partial information about the severity of an offender population. If a youth with prior violent offenses were re-committed for a misdemeanor, it would not be fair to consider this youth simply a misdemeanorant. Perhaps many of the Georgia youths committed for relatively minor offenses had been adjudicated previously for serious, violent crimes such that any new infraction was thought to present substantial risk to the community. Bringing information about prior offenses into the analysis, however, makes simple tables increasingly less useful. Therefore, the study now turns to the calculation of risk scores.

Risk scores were calculated using a number of elements from each youth's record and combining them into one weighted number.⁷ Points were added for the commitment offense and the most serious prior offense. The point values assigned for particular offenses were determined by surveying the members of the task force and calculating the numeric averages of their responses.⁸ (The point values assigned to each type of offense are listed in Appendix III.)

For example, a youth would receive ten points if his or her commitment offense was a serious violent charge such as rape, armed robbery, or murder. If the same youth's most serious prior adjudication was also for a serious violent offense, another nine points were added to the score. If there were no prior offenses in the youth's record, only the commitment offense contributed points to the risk score.

Points were also added for chronic offenders. In other words, an offender with many juvenile court appearances resulting in delinquency adjudications was given points in addition to the points assigned for the commitment and most serious prior offense. If an offender had more than two prior court appearances that resulted in adjudications for charges more serious than a status offense, two points were added

7 The scores are weighted in the sense that the various elements do not contribute equally to the final score. The commitment offense and the most serious prior adjudication will usually account for about 60 percent of the points in each youth's risk score.

8 The offense scores used in this study reflect the average values of the task force members and do not represent the views of the authors. See the "Authors' Afterword" at the conclusion of this report for additional discussion of the scoring procedures.

to the score. Five or more prior court appearances resulted in yet another three points, for a total of five points.

Points were also added for an early "onset" of court involvement-- an adjudication before the age of thirteen earned one point. Finally, if the youth's drug and alcohol profile in the DYS risk assessment system indicated that drug use was a serious problem or was involved in the incident resulting in their most recent commitment, another point was added to the score. (These would be youths scoring four or five points on the DYS alcohol/drug profile.)

The combination of all these factors produces a range of scores. The lowest possible score would be zero. For example, if a youth with no prior offenses (0 points) was adjudicated for a status offense (0 points), at age 16 (0 points), and was not known to use drugs at all (0 points), his or her score would obviously be zero.

The highest possible score, on the other hand, would be a 26. This would result from a youth whose commitment and most serious prior offenses were both violent felonies (10 and 9 points respectively), who had 5 prior court encounters resulting in adjudication (5 points) including one before the age of 13 (1 point), and who used drugs to the extent it was considered a serious problem (1 point).

Interpretation of Risk Scores

The reader is cautioned not to think of the risk scores in this study as predictions of future delinquency in a statistical sense. Predicting the probability of future delinquency is just as problematic as any other attempt to analyze human behavior. Considerable research, however, has shown that these factors can generally distinguish repeat, chronic offenders from other juveniles who will most likely desist from crime earlier and engage in less serious criminal behavior before they do.

In general, any youth with a score of ten or more on the risk assessment could be considered for secure placement. Scores over ten will be called "high" risk scores in the following analysis. Youths with adjudications for serious, violent crimes (i.e., those scored as 10 points) would be automatically considered for secure care. Youths with a history of serious offenses would also be considered for secure care as

the combination of their commitment and prior offenses would easily surpass ten points.

Youths who score six points or less should almost always be served through community-based programs. Scores of less than seven will be referred to as "low" risk scores. While low-risk youths may require some form of placement in order to receive services, there should almost never be a case where incarceration in a secure facility is chosen for youths scoring under 7 points.

Youths in the middle of the continuum, those scoring from seven to nine points, will be said to have "medium" risk scores. Such youths would undoubtedly need special services and supervision. These youths, however, should also be considered for non-institutional, community-based placements, provided high-quality programs are available ranging from intensive probation to residential treatment.

The Role of Risk Scores in Decision-Making


The risk assessment scores are a guide. They can bring greater objectivity and consistency to the commitment/placement process by ranking adjudicated juveniles along a continuum of risk. It is essential to remember, however, that the risk scores represent a continuum. The three groups of risk scores -- low, medium, and high -- are useful for policy discussion, but they should not be thought of as rigid boundaries.

The risk scores are also not exact placement recommendations. Some youths scoring relatively low may need intensive services and close supervision due to special circumstances other than the severity of their offenses. Other youths whose offenses appear quite severe may be able to do well in community-based programs due to a strong and supportive family, or a particularly good local program. Discerning which cases involve such special circumstances requires the "discretion" of judges, agency professionals, and those who best know the youth.

Risk assessment analyses, however, can be an important check on discretion. The level of security recommended for an individual offender should be closely tied to the risk he or she presents to the public safety. Other factors, such as their need for treatment, should be considered when deciding which particular service provider to

use, or whether to focus services on vocational, educational, or psychological goals. The decision whether to incarcerate should be based upon risk to the public.

Figure 1: The Role of Risk Assessment Scores in Decision-Making: Placing the Burden of Proof Required to Justify Placement Decisions



The results of discretion in the system can depart significantly from what would be suggested by an assessment of risk. An effective policy structure, therefore, would incorporate routine monitoring of the appropriate balance. As depicted in Figure 1, discretionary influences in commitment and placement decisions should be subjected to increasing scrutiny as those decisions deviate further from a framework of public risk. In other words, the highest burden of proof should be on recommendations that run counter to a public risk perspective.

YDC Risk Scores

Table 13 contains the frequency and percentage distributions of the risk scores for all YDC youths.⁹ The scores ranged from a low of 4 points to a high of 23 points. Table 13 shows that there were 30 youths placed in a YDC on March 1 who scored "low" on the risk assessment. An additional 176 youths scored as "medium" risks. Thus, 206 youths, or 33 percent of the total YDC population on March 1, 1990, scored as low or medium risks. Youths with these scores should almost always be considered for alternative placements.

Table 14 examines the distribution of risk scores within counties. It demonstrates that youths from smaller counties (those with populations of fewer than 50,000) had somewhat lower risk scores than youths from more urban areas. Forty percent of these youths scored as low or medium on the risk assessment. Such a finding is consistent with studies in other states. Smaller, less prosperous counties typically contend that inadequate local services compel them to commit delinquent offenders to the state sooner than larger counties with more placement options.

In Table 15, the risk scores of the YDC youths can be seen to vary slightly by ethnicity. Whereas 62 percent of the White youths scored high on the risk assessment, this was true of 68 percent of non-White youths. The reader is reminded, however, that many factors play a part in how individual offenders are treated by the courts and the juvenile justice system. The risk scores in this study merely reflect the accumulation of all these factors since they are based upon official charges and dispositions.

⁹ The tables presenting information on risk scores may not add to previous totals because some cases had missing data which prevented the calculation of scores.

TABLE 13
Risk Scores of YDC Youths

	n	Pct.
Risk Scores		
Low		
4	2	0%
5	16	3%
6	12	2%
Medium		
7	23	4%
8	88	14%
9	65	10%
High		
10	88	14%
11	71	11%
12	59	9%
13	39	6%
14	46	7%
15	39	6%
16	18	3%
17	21	3%
18	11	2%
19	11	2%
20	6	1%
21	3	0%
22	2	0%
23	2	0%
Grouped Risk Scores		
Low	30	5%
Medium	176	28%
High	416	67%
Total	622	100%

TABLE 14
Risk Scores of YDC Youths by County Size

	Population of Committing County					
	Over 200,000		50 to 200,000		Under 50,000	
	n	Pct.	n	Pct.	n	Pct.
Risk Scores						
Low	10	4%	11	5%	9	6%
Medium	68	28%	53	25%	55	34%
High	168	68%	149	70%	99	51%
Total	246	100%	213	100%	163	100%

TABLE 15
Risk Scores of YDC Youths by Ethnicity

	Ethnicity				Total	
	White		Non-White		n	Pct.
	n	Pct.	n	Pct.		
Risk Scores						
Low	5	4%	25	5%	30	5%
Medium	43	34%	133	27%	176	28%
High	79	62%	337	68%	416	67%
Total	127	100%	495	100%	622	100%

Table 16 provides the risk scores according to the YDCs in which the youths were placed. Not surprisingly, the Milledgeville YDC had the greatest proportion of high risk youths (85 percent). The other YDCs varied in their risk profiles. In the Augusta YDC, for example, 37 percent of the offenders scored as either low or medium risks, suggesting that they could be considered for other, less restrictive settings. Half (55 percent) of the Atlanta YDC population, and nearly two-thirds (66

percent) of the Macon YDC had low or medium risk scores. Thus, the majority of females in Georgia Youth Development Centers (i.e., at the Macon YDC) had low or medium scores. The high proportion of low and medium risk scores at the Atlanta YDC is most likely a function of the relatively young offenders in that facility.

TABLE 16
Risk Scores of YDC Youths by Placement

	Current Placement					
	Atlanta YDC		Augusta YDC		Millgrove YDC	
	n	Pct.	n	Pct.	n	Pct.
Risk Scores						
Low	10	10%	7	3%	1	0%
Medium	44	45%	80	34%	35	15%
High	44	45%	150	63%	203	85%
Total	98	100%	237	100%	239	100%

(continued)

TABLE 16
Risk Scores of YDC Youths by Placement

	Current Placement				Total	
	Macon YDC		Macon A&D		n	Pct.
	n	Pct.	n	Pct.		
Risk Scores						
Low	10	29%	2	15%	30	5%
Medium	13	37%	4	31%	176	28%
High	12	34%	7	54%	416	57%
Total	35	100%	13	100%	622	100%

Non-YDC Risk Scores

Using the same set of factors and the same scoring procedures, risk scores were also calculated for the committed youths placed in settings other than the YDCs as of March 1. Table 17 presents these scores according to whether the youths had been placed in a YDC at any point in the past. Once again, the primary focus are the left-hand columns which represent the committed youths without previous YDC admissions.

The proportion of youths in the lower range of scores is much greater, as would be expected. Over 80 percent of these youths scored in the low and medium risk categories. This would be expected since although they are committed, these youths had never been placed in a YDC and were currently placed in alternative settings. Still, a substantial proportion (17 percent) of Non-YDC juveniles scored ten or more points. Thus, there are some committed delinquents being supervised in alternative settings whose records are similar to youths placed in the YDCs.

The 1,645 committed youths described in the left-hand columns of Table 17 include all juveniles not placed in the YDCs. Obviously, some of these were placed in other residential settings, or on aftercare status from a residential placement. Table 18 explores whether the risk scores of the Non-YDC youths varied by placement setting. It would not be surprising, after all, to find that some of the youths scoring high in the risk assessment were placed in group homes, drug treatment centers, and hospitals. Of more interest would be the youths in non-residential settings who scored high on the risk assessment.

The data in Table 18 portray only those youths who had never been in a YDC but were committed and placed on March 1, 1990.¹⁰ Of those youths, 29 percent were in a residential setting and 22 percent were being supervised on aftercare status. Thus, about half of the youths were in non-residential placements. Table 18 shows that 157 youths in non-residential placements scored over 9 points on the risk assessment.

¹⁰ Placement information was missing for six youths in Table 18, thus the total of all columns is 1,639 instead of 1,645.

TABLE 17
Risk Scores of Non-YDC Youths

Risk Scores	Prior YDC Admissions			
	No		Yes	
	n	Pct.	n	Pct.
Low				
0	8	0%	0	0%
1	46	3%	0	0%
2	71	4%	2	0%
3	131	8%	7	1%
4	140	9%	10	1%
5	240	15%	45	5%
6	196	12%	43	4%
Medium				
7	160	10%	71	7%
8	215	13%	100	10%
9	164	10%	135	14%
High				
10	96	6%	131	13%
11	65	4%	114	11%
12	40	2%	84	8%
13	25	2%	62	6%
14	31	2%	52	5%
15	9	1%	53	5%
16	3	0%	27	3%
17	2	0%	18	2%
18	1	0%	18	2%
19	0	0%	13	1%
20	1	0%	6	1%
21	0	0%	2	0%
22	1	0%	3	0%
24	0	0%	2	0%
Grouped Risk Scores				
Low	832	51%	107	11%
Medium	539	33%	306	31%
High	274	17%	585	59%
Total	1645	100%	998	100%

Note: Totals may not add due to missing data and/or rounding.

TABLE 18
Risk Scores of Non-YDC Youths
Without Prior YDC Admissions, by Placement

	Current Placement					
	Non-Residential		Residential		Aftercare	
	n	Pct.	n	Pct.	n	Pct.
Risk Scores						
Low						
0	5	1%	2	0%	1	0%
1	16	2%	15	3%	15	4%
2	29	4%	22	5%	20	6%
3	52	6%	50	11%	28	8%
4	62	8%	43	9%	34	9%
5	112	14%	65	14%	61	17%
6	95	12%	51	11%	50	14%
Medium						
7	86	11%	42	9%	31	9%
8	114	14%	55	12%	45	12%
9	78	10%	52	11%	34	9%
High						
10	54	7%	30	6%	12	3%
11	38	5%	13	3%	14	4%
12	21	3%	14	3%	5	1%
13	14	2%	6	1%	5	1%
14	15	2%	10	2%	6	2%
15	8	1%	1	0%	0	0%
16	2	0%	1	0%	0	0%
17	2	0%	0	0%	0	0%
18	1	0%	0	0%	0	0%
20	1	0%	0	0%	0	0%
22	1	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Grouped Risk Scores						
Low	371	46%	248	53%	209	58%
Medium	278	34%	149	32%	110	30%
High	157	19%	75	16%	42	12%
Total	806	100%	472	100%	361	100%

Note: Totals may not add due to missing data and/or rounding.

IMPLICATIONS

The risk scores of the committed youths placed in alternative settings were notably lower than those of the YDC youths, as would be expected. Of the more than 1600 youths under commitment status who had never before been placed in a YDC, only 17 percent scored over 9 points on the risk assessment, and many of these were placed in other residential facilities. Even among youths in non-residential placements, however, 157 had scores of 10 or above. A small number (65) of these youths scored 12 or more on the risk assessment. It would be particularly important to follow the experiences of these juveniles in order to determine whether such youths can be supervised effectively in alternative programs.

Who are the 157?

In order to know more about the 157 Non-YDC youths who had high scores but were placed in alternative settings, a computerized process was used to select at random several cases from among the database. This process did not control for any case characteristics other than 1) the risk score had to be at least ten points, 2) the youth had to be in a non-residential placement, and 3) the youth had no previous YDC admissions.

The following case studies are actual committed youths from the study sample. Their names are fictitious. They are not chronic or violent offenders typically. More often, they are property offenders who appeared to be suitable for community treatment.

Tim is a 16-year-old Black male recently committed to DYS for a charge of Burglary stemming from an incident in which he and three friends broke into a concession stand and stole some candy. He had been charged with two prior counts of theft at age 13, both involving the theft of motorcycles. He was put on probation for these charges. Tim was described as doing relatively well in school, getting all B's and C's. His teachers gave him high marks for his conduct in class. His mother reports no problems at home, although he doesn't always come home on time. Tim's parents separated when he was 7 years old. His mother receives AFDC.

Mark is a 17-year-old White male who was referred to a drug program as a result of his recent commitment to DYS for Attempted Burglary and a charge of Fleeing. Mark and two other juveniles tried to gain entry to a business establishment by throwing a steel pipe through a window. Before they could do so, Mark and his friends were seen and they ran away. Mark had two prior offenses, both auto thefts. In one incident, he stole his father's truck; in the other, he stole his sister's car. Mark had been skipping classes at school, where he was described as capable, but unmotivated. Mark's father asked the court for a superior court commitment and for Mark to be incarcerated in an adult facility in order to "straighten him up."

Eric is a 17-year old African American who was committed to DYS for possessing a small amount of marijuana which was found by undercover agents who stopped Eric and searched him. Three years ago, Eric had one charge of shoplifting and one charge of possessing a weapon for which he was put on probation. He had also been expelled from school recently. Eric was placed with a Community Treatment Center as a result of this commitment. He lives with his mother who works two jobs to support the family. He hasn't had much contact with his father.

Stan is a also African American, and only 13 years old. He was committed for stealing a car with several friends. Stan was referred to a Community Treatment Center. Prior to the recent charge, Stan had been involved in four other theft incidents as well as being charged for truancy and disorderly behavior. His court appearances started when Stan was 11 years old. He lives with his mother who is single and unemployed.

Tony is a 15-year-old Black male who was committed for a charge of obstructing an officer. Tony fled from officers who were seeking to carry out a "pick-up order." The incident that prompted the pick-up order involved an allegation that Tony had carried a weapon into his school building. Tony has been on probation twice, for theft and disorderly conduct. He has an IQ of 68 and attends an alternative school. His commitment resulted in a referral to a Community Treatment Center.

These randomly selected cases present a picture of deprivation and/or family turmoil. In each case, the nature of the youth's offenses placed him in the high-risk category, but the decision was made not to place him in the YDC. Although this decision would seem to contradict the risk framework presented above, there is nothing inherently inappropriate about the special circumstances of an apparently high-risk case contributing to an alternative disposition. Accordingly, a score of 8 or 9 should not automatically dictate community placement.

The fact that some objectively high-risk youths are referred to alternative settings is also not unique to Georgia. Many states have discovered that delinquent youths with significant court records can still be handled in settings other than YDCs, provided that the programs entail close supervision and a range of educational, vocational, and family services.

A recent experiment conducted by the juvenile court in Detroit, Michigan found that even for relatively serious offenders (excluding only those with serious violent charges), alternatives such as intensive probation are just as effective as commitment and incarceration at curbing recidivism. Yet, these programs usually cost about one-third as much as commitment on a per-offender basis.¹¹ Thus, with the amount of public funds required to commit and incarcerate one juvenile, about three can be supervised on intensive probation with comparable results.

POLICY CONTEXT¹²

Georgia's elected officials face much the same policy environment found in other states. Debate and discussion about juvenile justice is often heavily influenced by two popular beliefs: that juvenile crime is on the increase, and that the best way to respond to juvenile crime of all kinds is through the use of correctional institutions.

Most juvenile justice professionals, however, argue that secure, institutional confinement should be reserved for the most severe cases in which a youth's behavior has shown him or her to be an actual danger to the community. In the State of Georgia, for example, a Department of Human Resources/DYS task force report released in 1987 advocated that a continuum of juvenile services be maintained by "minimizing" entry into the juvenile justice system, and emphasizing "community-based programs rather than institutions for status offenders and for delinquent offenders who do not pose a significant risk to the public."¹³ This approach to the juvenile crime problem offers the greatest potential for maximizing the cost-effectiveness of the juvenile justice system.

11. Barton & Butts, *Viable Options: Intensive Supervision Programs for Juvenile Delinquents*, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 81-238 (1990).

12. Some of this discussion is adapted directly from previous risk assessments published by the Center for the Study of Youth Policy. Since many issues related to risk assessments are the same in every state, introductory and explanatory material resembles earlier studies conducted in other jurisdictions. All conclusions and recommendations, however, are based solely upon the information and data gathered in Georgia. (See Appendix I for a list of previous CSYP risk assessment studies.)

13. DHR/DYS Task Force, TASK FORCE ON A CONTINUUM OF SERVICES FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS at 7 and Appendix A at 1 (May, 1987).

This approach is also the one advocated by more than two decades of federal policy. The federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act¹⁴, for example, encourages states to deinstitutionalize status offenders (i.e., runaways, school truants, youths in conflict with their parents, etc.),¹⁵ eliminate the jailing of juveniles in adult facilities,¹⁶ and develop community-based alternatives for non-violent and non-chronic delinquent youths.¹⁷ The U.S. Congress has repeatedly asserted that although training schools are an essential component of the continuum of services in youth corrections, institutional confinement should be used primarily for violent and chronic juvenile law violators.¹⁸

Juvenile justice standards developed by the Institute for Judicial Administration/American Bar Association also recommend that "[i]n choosing among statutorily permissible options, the court should employ the least restrictive category and duration of disposition that is appropriate to the seriousness of the offense, as modified by the degree of culpability indicated by the circumstances of the particular case, and by the age and prior record of the juvenile."¹⁹ The IJA/ABA standards state clearly that juvenile courts should maintain a juvenile at home whenever possible: "Removal from home is the most severe disposition authorized for adjudicated juveniles. As such, it should be reserved for the most serious or repetitive offenses, and rarely, if ever, used for younger juveniles."²⁰

Few policy makers or professionals would disagree that costly institutional placements should be reserved for violent or serious juvenile offenders, and that less expensive, community-based programs should be relied upon for less serious offenders. It is basic, fiscal conservatism. Limited public resources should be focused

14 P.L. 93-415, 42 U.S.C. § 5601 et seq. as amended (1980 & 1988).

15 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12)(A).

16 *Id.* § 5633(e)(14).

17 *Id.* § 5633(e)(12)(B).

18 Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juv. Delinq. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1975).

19 Institute for Judicial Administration/American Bar Association, *Standards Relating to Dispositions* at 34 (1980).

20 *Id.* at 62.

on the areas where they are most needed, and should be spread as much as possible so that each aspect of a problem receives just the level of budgetary attention it requires - no more, no less. Good, practical policy would no sooner lock up each and every juvenile offender for 18 months than it would perform open-heart surgery on every Medicaid recipient with chest pains.

The established consensus around this concept, of course, is elusive in practice. Who is to decide what constitutes a "serious offender" or when a youth poses a "significant risk" to the community? To what degree should this decision be shared by the judicial, legislative and executive branches? Some would argue that the juvenile justice system should intervene when a youth appears to be "at risk" for serious delinquency, even if he or she has not yet been adjudicated for a serious crime. Others would maintain that the decision to incarcerate should be based on a youth's proven offenses and that it is an abuse of the state's power to incarcerate a young person merely because the professional community thinks he or she is "likely" to commit a serious crime.

Even if the system responds only to adjudicated (i.e., legally substantiated) offenses, which offenses are serious enough to demand incarceration? Obviously, youths who have committed serious and violent crimes (such as murder, rape, and armed robbery) require a strong, perhaps even punitive response from the justice system. What about less serious, non-violent offenses? When does a pattern of repeat property offenses become a "danger" to the community? How do we distinguish between the actual harm done by an individual act and the larger social problem represented by that act -- e.g., the sale of cocaine? Obviously, the proper use of juvenile institutions becomes more ambiguous once we go beyond conceptual frameworks.

How Many Beds?

The ambiguities in juvenile corrections will not be resolved by bigger and better classification systems. The extent of institutional placements in the juvenile justice system, and the locus of decision-making over those placements, are inherently political issues. Advocates of incarceration argue that the public demands protection from violent youths and that young criminals need a "taste" of incarceration to set them

straight. Public opinion polls, on the other hand, reveal widespread support for emphasizing rehabilitation in juvenile corrections.²¹

Furthermore, the best available research evidence indicates that although secure confinement is always more expensive, it is not more effective in terms of rehabilitation when compared to alternatives such as intensive probation, in-home supervision, and tracking programs.²² And rehabilitation -- the reduction or elimination of recidivism -- is still the goal of the juvenile justice system. If rehabilitation of juveniles were abandoned in favor of simple punishment and incapacitation, there would be no more need to distinguish juvenile offenders from adults. In fact, there would be no need for a juvenile court at all.

Despite the proven cost-effectiveness of alternative programs, and the general consensus that secure confinement should be reserved for violent and serious offenders, policy makers frequently confront pressures for more juvenile corrections beds. The question commonly asked at such times is, "how many institutional beds do we need?" The answer to this question ought to be derivable from: 1) detailed population projections and crime rate analyses that predict the number and type of future juvenile offenders in the state, and 2) a classification and placement system that determines the particular services needed for every type of delinquent offender likely to appear in the court system. Yet, projections of correctional capacity needs are always confounded by political as well as technical factors, and are inevitably prone to error.

Even if population projections and classification matrices were technically feasible and statistically reliable, public juvenile justice systems would rarely be able to predict the demand for correctional beds. This is because the use of incarceration is not simply a function of demographic changes, nor is it a direct and proportionate

21 SCHWARTZ & ABBEY, 1990 MICHIGAN JUVENILE CRIME SURVEY: SUMMARY REPORT # 1 (1990); Steinhart, *California Opinion Poll: Public Attitudes on Youth Crime*, NCCD FOCUS at p. 7 (1990); Galvin & Folk, *Juvenile Justice: Time for New Direction?*, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. at p. 330 (1993).

22 Webb & Scanlon, *The Effectiveness of Institutional and Community-Based Programs for Juvenile Offenders*, JUV. AND FAM. COURT JOURNAL at 11 (August, 1981); EMPEY & LUBECK, THE SILVERLAKE EXPERIMENT (1972); Gendreau & Ross, *Revivification of Rehabilitation: Evidence From the 1980s*, 4 JUST. QUART. at 349 (1987); McCarthy, INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS: INTENSIVE SUPERVISION, HOME CONFINEMENT AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (1987), Nat'l Comm. on Crime and Delinq., UNLOCKING JUVENILE CORRECTIONS (1989); Austin, Joe, Krisberg, & Stebb, *The Impact of Juvenile Court Sanctions: A Court that Works*, NCCD FOCUS (March, 1990); Barton & Butts, *Viable Options: Intensive Supervision Programs for Juvenile Delinquents*, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. at 236 (1990).

response to the rate of criminal behavior. Governments make choices about how many correctional beds they will use.

The criminologist Nils Christie recently pointed out that the United States ranks second in the world in the proportion of its population incarcerated in jails and prisons.²³ We used to rank third, just behind the Soviet Union and South Africa. During the 1980s, however, we surpassed the USSR and are now second only to South Africa. Such high rates cannot be explained by the incidence of crime in the U.S. There have been some increases in the proportion of arrests associated with drug offenses, but the overall crime rate in the U.S. rose only 2 percent in the 1980s. Yet, the rate of incarceration doubled during that time.²⁴ In Georgia, the per-capita rate of juvenile commitments increased 31 percent between FY 1988 and the middle of FY 1990 alone.²⁵

The increasing use of incarceration in Georgia and the U.S. as a whole is most likely the result of several forces, including 1) the growing attractiveness of the drug economy to chronically poor youths, and our lack of inventiveness in dealing with this problem, 2) our relatively easy access to weapons compared to other developed nations, and 3) the recent popularity ofeterminate sentencing policies which mandate long periods of incarceration for more and more offenders and inevitably drive up the incarcerated population. These social and political forces behind the use of incarceration make it nearly impossible to say with any certainty how many juvenile correctional beds will be "needed" in the coming years. Our "need" for incarceration appears to be limited only by our appetite for it.

A more answerable question, however, can be asked: "Do currently available institutional resources seemed to be used appropriately?" In other words, given current knowledge about juvenile offenders and corrections, do the youths in Georgia's juvenile institutions seem like the type who usually end up in secure confinement? If it seems that many do not, the clear implication is that the system needs to examine its configuration of services and place more emphasis on non-

23 Prison Rate Seen Reflecting U.S. Society, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL AND CONSTITUTION at D-5 (July 10, 1990).

24 *Ibid.*

25 From 3.92 to 5.12 per 1,000 population, according to DYS staff.

institutional, alternative programs. This is the question addressed by risk assessment studies.

Designated Felons

The low-scoring youths placed in the YDCs, and the high-scoring youths placed in non-residential settings, are the results of discretion in the commitment and placement process. As mentioned earlier, discretion is a necessary and appropriate component of any juvenile justice system. In Georgia, discretion is exercised when the juvenile court decides upon adjudications and when the Division of Youth Services makes decisions about appropriate treatment plans.

The designated felony legislation implemented in Georgia in recent years appears to have eroded much of the discretion which is needed to run the juvenile justice system effectively. Much of the dramatic increase in commitments to DYS has been prompted by the designated felony law. Currently, about 40 percent of juvenile commitments placed in the YDCs are designated felons; and nearly 80 percent of these are Black.²⁶

Georgia policy makers should consider very carefully whether the state can afford to use such a blunt instrument as the designated felony law to solve its crime problems. There are many aspects of corrections about which we know very little. One thing we do know is that incarceration is not an effective deterrent, nor does it rehabilitate. Locking up offenders accomplishes only one thing. It keeps them out of circulation and off the street.

Criminologists call this "Incapacitation", and it is an essential part of any good correctional policy. Incapacitation, however, is the most expensive correctional strategy we have. As such, it should be used only when necessary, primarily in the case of violent and chronic offenders. To use it for a large proportion of non-violent offenders, including many 2-time property offenders, is not only ineffective crime control but fiscally irresponsible as well.

²⁶ According to DYS records.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The risk assessment study found that 33 percent of the youths placed in Georgia's Youth Development Centers had low and medium risk scores suggesting that they could be supervised in community-based programs, provided good programs were available. A number of reports have examined this issue in the recent past. A 1987 commission chaired by former Chief Justice Thomas O. Marshall, for example, estimated that closer to half of the youths in Georgia's YDCs could be handled in other, less expensive settings.

This report does not attempt to replicate any previous analyses or to verify the findings of any previous studies. Thus, there is no basis for direct comparisons between this report and any prior reports. Whether the proportion of YDC youths considered eligible for alternative settings is 33 percent, or 50 percent, or something in between, however, it should be clear that there are a substantial number of Georgia youths currently being placed in expensive, security-oriented institutions who could possibly be supervised more cost-effectively.

The risk assessment study also identified a substantial number of youths in placements other than a YDC who had risk scores of 10 points or more (i.e., the range of scores normally considered eligible for placement in a YDC). Half of these youths, of course, were either on aftercare from a previous placement or currently placed in a residential program such as a group home or a psychiatric hospital. Still, there were 157 youths under commitment on the study day who: 1) had never been placed in a YDC before, 2) were currently being supervised in non-residential settings such as community treatment or intensive supervision, and 3) had scores of 10 or above on the risk assessment.

There will undoubtedly be some readers of this report who think that since there were 206 YDC youths with scores of less than 10 points, and 157 non-YDC youths with scores over 10, that the risk assessment identifies 49 excess secure beds. This interpretation is not supported by the logic of this analysis. As stated earlier, the risk scores are not intended to serve as rigid placement criteria. It is deliberately misleading to suggest that all youths with scores of 10 should be incarcerated while all youths with scores of 9 should be on probation or in a community setting.

Moreover, the explicit intent of two decades of juvenile justice policy, as well as the mandates of fiscal responsibility, suggest that juvenile offenders should be handled in the least restrictive setting consistent with the public safety. The biggest challenge in criminal justice policy is to resist the seductive appeal of incarceration as an all-purpose solution for every type of offender. Accordingly, there should be much more scrutiny brought to bear on instances of "over-placement" than "under-placement." There is very little chance that public safety concerns can justify the high social and fiscal costs of incarcerating "low-risk" misdemeanants and minor property offenders. Conversely, however, there are great social benefits to be gained by maximizing the use of cost-effective, community-based programs for the broadest range of offenders - even "high-risk" albeit non-violent offenders. Evaluation research has established that this benefit can be obtained without great risk to the public safety (see footnote 22).

This report should be taken as a starting point for productive discussions about the future of the state's youth services system, and as a challenge to those who will lead those discussions. As the next decade unfolds, the Division of Youth Services will be developing new programs in order to meet its dual responsibilities of providing effective services to troubled youths while at the same time protecting the safety of the public. The Division should be encouraged to maximize the assortment of programs it offers to adjudicated delinquents. State policy makers, in fact, already have a good start at designing an effective continuum of services for juvenile offenders. The existing continuum, however, should be allowed to function. Both practical good sense and the available research evidence argues that the juvenile justice system should rely on a full range of sanctions for juvenile offenders and not invest all its resources in incarceration.

AUTHORS' AFTERWORD

This study is offered as a source of information and a guide for future planning. It is not a comprehensive juvenile justice policy framework. It was never intended as such. The future direction of the juvenile justice system lies in the hands of Georgia's professionals and decision makers. The recent history of youth services in the state, however, has often been characterized by political conflict and at times a lack of trust among the judicial, legislative, and executive branches of government. It can be difficult in such a climate to develop the consensus required to improve programs and policies for disadvantaged and troubled young people.

The task force encountered such difficulty when it attempted to reach consensus on specific applications of the risk assessment, its meaning, and presentation. Other, more general policy recommendations were agreed upon. These included:

- The juvenile justice system must balance concerns for the public safety with the needs and rights of juveniles.
- Incarceration and secure confinement should be reserved for serious and violent offenders. Non-violent, less serious offenders should be managed in alternative settings to the extent possible.
- The juvenile justice system in Georgia needs more, high-quality alternative programs.
- The impact and effectiveness of Georgia's designated felony statute should be reviewed.

Moving beyond these general principles and reaching consensus on particular aspects of the risk assessment was more difficult. We have been involved in risk assessment studies in a number of other states, and have worked with a broad range of political and administrative decision makers. The level of disagreement among the members of the Georgia task force was more than we've encountered in other states. This is not surprising, since the composition of the task force was diverse. The fact that a few members continued to disagree even after a long process of compromise,

however, should be taken as a caution for Georgia decision makers seeking to improve the state's youth services system.

In seeking to obtain consensus on all aspects of the study, we believe the risk assessment may have become overly restrictive. The instrument used to compile and analyze the data on committed delinquents departed significantly from what we would consider standard practice. In addition, our interpretations and conclusions may have become too cautious. Yet, we encountered considerable disagreement from a few members when presenting the final report to the task force. Although we had made every attempt to accommodate the views and opinions of the task force members, it was clear that some members were not entirely satisfied with the results of the study.

We believe the findings would be substantially different if we were to start over and conduct the study ourselves. To test this, we re-analyzed the data using a scoring system more similar to studies we have conducted in other states. The primary difference between this system and the system developed by the task force is that in this scoring system the youths' offenses are rated according to a more stringent public safety perspective. Scores for violent offenses are rated high and remain virtually the same as in the task force scoring system. Drug offenses, however, are scored more similar to serious property offenses. Minor property offenses, misdemeanors, and rule violations (e.g., contempt of court) are rated somewhat lower than the instrument developed by the task force. Finally, the scores for prior offenses are adjusted slightly to account for the fact that the task force rated prior offenses much higher relative to commitment offenses than has been done in other states.

As expected, when we reanalyzed the data using a more standard scoring system the results were different. Authors' Table 13 presents the same information as Table 13 in the main body of the report, but uses the more standard scores. It shows that 48 percent of the youths placed in YDCs were in the low and medium risk range. Thus, the risk assessment developed by the task force may under-estimate the proportion of youths in the YDCs who could be handled in other settings. Authors' Table 18 is a duplicate of Table 18 from the report, once again using the alternate scoring system. It shows that although there are still some youths in non-residential placements with scores in the high range, the total number of such youths is 81, compared to 157 in Table 18.

AUTHORS' TABLE 13
Authors' Risk Scores of YDC Youths

	n	Pct.
Authors' Risk Scores		
Low		
2	1	0%
3	2	0%
4	13	2%
5	14	2%
6	58	9%
Medium		
7	64	10%
8	69	11%
9	76	12%
High		
10	81	13%
11	58	9%
12	49	8%
13	36	6%
14	34	5%
15	20	3%
16	18	3%
17	11	2%
18	7	1%
19	7	1%
20	2	0%
21	1	0%
22	1	0%
Grouped Scores		
Low	88	14%
Medium	209	34%
High	325	52%
Total	622	100%

AUTHORS' TABLE 13
 Authors' Risk Scores of Non-YDC Youths
 Without Prior YDC Admissions, by Placement

	Current Placement					
	Non-Residential		Residential		Aftercare	
	n	Pct.	n	Pct.	n	Pct.
Authors' Risk Scores						
Low						
0	12	1%	4	1%	5	1%
1	24	3%	24	5%	18	5%
2	62	8%	39	8%	29	8%
3	72	9%	62	13%	46	13%
4	108	13%	51	11%	53	15%
5	110	14%	61	13%	63	17%
6	112	14%	72	15%	40	11%
Medium						
7	110	14%	44	9%	38	11%
8	69	9%	50	11%	32	9%
9	46	6%	23	5%	10	3%
High						
10	23	3%	18	4%	15	4%
11	19	2%	13	3%	4	1%
12	21	3%	4	1%	4	1%
13	5	1%	6	1%	4	1%
14	7	1%	1	0%	0	0%
15	1	0%	0	0%	0	0%
16	3	0%	0	0%	0	0%
17	1	0%	0	0%	0	0%
19	1	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Grouped Scores						
Low	500	62%	313	66%	254	70%
Medium	225	28%	117	25%	80	22%
High	81	10%	42	9%	27	7%
Total	806	100%	472	100%	361	100%

Georgia decision makers should be responsible for setting the standards for Georgia's juvenile justice system. It is appropriate that the responsibility for guiding this study was shared by a group of Georgia officials. Any decision-making process in juvenile corrections is inherently tied to community standards and local preferences. There is no such thing as one scientifically correct response to juvenile crime, just as there is no one correct approach to analyzing juvenile crime data. From our perspective, however, the risk assessment instrument developed by the task force casts a wider net than instruments used in other states.²⁷

The assumptions and values built into risk assessments should be clear and carefully thought out. There is a tendency for elected officials and public administrators to err on the side of more incarceration when planning correctional programs and policy. This tendency has cost us dearly. One national study recently estimated that prison construction costs increased 73 percent between 1987-88 and 1989-90.²⁸ *(In this study, Georgia had the 6th highest costs in the country for adult prison construction.)* State governments throughout the country are discovering that their current correctional policies are hugely expensive, and cannot be proven effective by evaluation research.

The approach taken in this risk assessment is not the final word on juvenile corrections programming in Georgia. Additional efforts will have to be made in order to increase the cost-effectiveness of decisions to commit and place juvenile offenders. These efforts should begin with an acute awareness of (1) the diversity of opinions held by Georgia officials about how the state should address its juvenile crime problem, and (2) the fiscal and social implications of those opinions.

27 The net metaphor is used in criminology to indicate the means by which different proportions of the population are "caught" and processed through the stages of the criminal justice system, just as the number of fish one catches depends on the width, length, and mesh of one's fishing net.

28 Davis, Prison Construction Booms In U.S. - Up 73 Percent, *Corrections Compendium* Vol 14(7) at 10 (September-October 1989).

APPENDIX I:
Previous Risk Assessment Studies by the Center for the Study of Youth Policy

- DeMuro, P. & Butts, J.A. (1988). *Report to the juvenile justice task force: Rhode Island's juvenile justice system - more of the same ... or an opportunity for reform?* Consultant Report for the Office of the Attorney General, State of Rhode Island. Ann Arbor, MI: Center for the Study of Youth Policy.
- Butts, J.A. & DeMuro, P. (1989). *Risk assessment of adjudicated delinquents.* Consultant Report for the Division for Children and Youth Services, State of New Hampshire. Ann Arbor, MI: Center for the Study of Youth Policy.
- DeMuro, P. & Butts, J.A. (1989). *At the crossroads: A population profile of youths committed to the Alabama Department of Youth Services.* Consultant Report for the Department of Youth Services, State of Alabama. Funded by the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation.
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- Van Vleet, R.K. & Butts, J.A. (1990). *Risk assessment of committed delinquents: Nebraska youth development centers.* Consultant Report for the Division of Juvenile Services, Department of Correctional Services, State of Nebraska. Ann Arbor, MI: Center for the Study of Youth Policy.
- Van Vleet, R.K. & Steketee, M.W. (1990). *Alternatives for Arkansas juvenile justice: Report and risk assessment, committed delinquents and youthful offenders, Arkansas Youth Services Centers and Tucker Unit, Department of Correction.* Consultant Report for the State of Arkansas. Ann Arbor, MI: Center for the Study of Youth Policy.

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* Membership on the task force does not constitute an endorsement of every conclusion and interpretation in this report.

APPENDIX III

Scores for Offenses: Commitment and Most Serious Prior

<u>Offense</u>	<u>As Commitmt. Offense</u>	<u>As Most Serious Prior</u>
Murder	10	9
Kidnapping	10	9
Rape	10	9
Vol Manslaught	10	9
Armed Robbery	10	9
Vehic Homicide 1st Deg.	9	7
Aggravated Assault	9	7
Aggravated Sodomy	9	7
Aggravated Battery	9	7
Child Molestation	8	6
Att Murder RC	8	6
Att Kidnap RC	8	6
Att Murder NRC	8	6
Agg Kidnap NRC	8	6
Invol Manslaught	8	6
Agg Child Molest	8	6
Robbery	7	6
Escape w Force	7	6
Agg Asslt Corrc Ofc	8	6
Robbery NRC	7	6
Agg Assault NRC	7	6
Arson 1+2	8	6
Auto Theft	5	4
Burglary	5	4
Theft Over \$500	5	4

<u>Offense</u>	<u>As Commitnt. Offense</u>	<u>As Most Serious Prior</u>
Forgery	4	3
Theft of Firearm	5	4
Battery or Simp Batt	5	4
Concealed Weapon	5	4
Conceal Weap 2nd	6	5
Extortion	6	4
Trafficking in Cocaine	8	7
Sale of Schd III Drug	7	6
Sale of Schd III-V Drug	7	5
Poss 100lb Marij	7	6
Marij-Poss Over 1oz	5	4
Use of Schd III Drug	5	3
Poss Drug for Use	5	3
Marij-Poss Under 1oz	3	2
Inhal Subst	3	2
Poss Other Narc	5	3
Abandon Dangr Drug	4	3
Sel Facsimile Drug	5	3
Theft Under \$500	3	2
Arson 3	5	4
Forgery 2	4	3
Poss Crime Tools	3	2
Crim Damage 1	6	4
Crim Damage 2	4	2

<u>Offense</u>	<u>As Commitmt. Offense</u>	<u>As Most Serious Prior</u>
Entering Auto	4	3
Shoplift Under \$100	3	2
Burglary NRC	5	3
Att Elude/Flee	4	2
Sodomy	4	3
Serious Inj/Vehicle	5	3
Incest	3	2
Enticing a Child	6	4
Cruelty to Children	4	3
Statutory Rape	5	3
Vehle Homicide 2	6	5
Assault Correctn Ofer	6	4
Poss Weap During Crime	6	5
Carry Weapon Pub Gath	5	4
Credit Card Fraud	4	3
Pointing Gun at Person	6	4
Tresspass	3	2
Perjury	3	2
Obstruct Justice	3	2
Give False Name	2	1
Public Drunkenness	2	1
Public Disturbance	2	1
Reckless Endanger	3	2
Public Indecency	3	2
Simple / Assault	4	3

<u>Offense</u>	<u>As Commitnt. Offense</u>	<u>As Most Serious Prior</u>
Pandering	3	1
Obscene Cal's	2	1
Terroristic Threats	4	3
Soliciting	2	1
Prostitution	3	2
Alcohol Intox	2	1
Disorderly Conduct	2	1
Resisting Arrest	3	2
Reckless Drive	3	2
Loitering	1	0
False Public Alarm	2	1
Speeding Oth Traffic	1	0
False Fire Alarm	3	2
Affray-Fighting	2	1
Discharge Firearm Hghwy	4	2
Dischrg Firearm on Property	4	2
Carry Weap no Licens	3	2
Carry Sawed Shotgun	4	3
DUI	3	2
Drive w/o License	2	1
Dist Obscene Mat	1	0
Bestiality	1	0
Arson 2	3	2
Contrib Delinq	1	0
Gambling	1	0
Crim Use Altered ID	1	0

<u>Offense</u>	<u>As Commitnt. Offense</u>	<u>As Most Serious Prior</u>
Shoplift 4th Adjud	3	2
Contempt of Court	1	0
Aiding an Escape	1	0
Shoplift < \$100	1	0
Escape no Force	2	1
Harassing Calls	1	0
VOP	2	1
VOAP	2	1
VOAC	2	1
Runaway	0	0
Unruly	0	0
Truancy	0	0
Curfew	0	0
Runaway Out. State	0	0
Min Poss Alcohol	0	0